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Justice Powell
Bob
No. 86-728, Honig v. Doe
This case raises

important questions under the Education

/

for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 20 U.S.C. §1401 et seg.
The

resps,

two

emotionally

disturbed

tendencies,

are

handicapped

within

Resp Doe was
student

and

suspended
broke

a

children

the

with

meaning

of

aggressive
the

EAHCA.

indefinitely after he assaulted another

school

window.

Resp

Smith

was

suspended

after he made sexual comments to several female students.

The

school districts moved to expel both students.
Thev;C ordered that resps b; -readmitted,

and ~A9

affirmed.

CA9 placed a five-day limit on suspensions of handicapped children,

and

held

that

a

school district may not remove a handi-

capped child from school for a significant period of time without
completing an EAHCA proceeding, even if the child's handicappedrelated behavior endangers other children.

CA9 relied on the so-

called "stay put" provision of the EAHCA, which provides that a
handicapped child shall remain in his current educational placement during the pendency of any EAHCA review proceeding, unless

u.s.c.

the school district and the parents agree to a change.

20

§1415 (e) (3).

provision

CA9 's

interpretation of

the

~--------------------~

----

"stay put"

-

conflicts with holdings of CAS and CAll, which hold that school
districts retain authority to protect the safety of other children by suspending handicapped children.

(CAl has held that a DC

-

'

...

'

<.

page 2.

can order a change in placement while EAHCA proceedings are pending.)
CA9

also

held

that

the

EAHCA

forbids

...__-~-

any

"significant

change of program or services" until a handicapped child's needs
have been specially evaluated.

CA9 relied on 34 C.F.R. §104.35,

which requires that an "individualized educational program" CIEPJ
be undertaken before making any change in a handicapped child's
placement.

In its cert. petn, the State argues that §104.35 ap-

plies to the Rehabilitatibn Act and not the EAHCA.
however,

It appears,

that the State did not raise this argument below.

the lower cts,

In

the State argued that not all changes in program

or services amount to a "change in placement" covered by §104.35.
Finally, CA9 held that the State is required to intervene
if a

local

school district

under the EAHCA.

failing

to meet

u.s.c.

CA9 relied on 20

8 of the pool memo.
a

is

its obligations

§1414(d), set out on p.

The State argues that §1414Cd) applies where

category of children are

better

served

by attending a

state

school (such as a school for the deaf).

Congress did not mean to

require

district

the State

to

intervene

serve an individual student.

if

the

is

failing

to

The statute creates various appeals

mechanisms to redress the problems of individual students.
I

think

the question whether dangerous handicapped chil-

dren can be removed from school before the completion of an EAHCA
proceeding is an important one.

The disagreement among the cir-

cuits warrants a grant.
Questions 2 and 3 seem less important, there is no circuit
split,

•:t"··

and

the State

appears

not

to

have

raised

its

argument

page 3.

about the applicability of §104.35.
to examine what was raised below.

I agree with CFR, in order
On balance, it may be better

to decide all three questions, assuming they were raised below,
in order to provide guidance in this area.
I recommend a GRANT on Question 1, and grants on Questions
3 if it appears from the record that the issues were raised
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
January 9, 1987 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
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(

No. 86-728

v'

Honig {Ca. Superintendent
of Public Instruction)

Cert to CA9 {Sneed, Schroeder,
Brunetti)

v.
Doe et al. {handicapped
children)
1.

SUMMARY.

Federal/Civil

Timely

Petr seeks review of CA9's decision ruling {1)

that a school district may not remove from school for a
significant period of time a handicapped child whose handicaprelated behavior endangers himself or others until completion of

-------------------

an Education for All Handicapped Children Act proceeding;

{2)

that a child's needs must be specially evaluated under elaborate
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procedures before any "significant change ,of program or services"
is made;

and (3) that where a local school district is not

meeting its obligation to provide services to a particular
handicapped child, the State must step in.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW.

Resps Doe and Smith are

emotionally disturbed children with aggressive tendencies in
certain circumstances, and are accordingly handicapped within the
meaning of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA), 20 u.s.c. §1401 et seq.l

Pursuant to an individualized

educational program (IEP), the San Francisco Unified School
District placed Doe at the Louise Lombard School, a developmental
center for the handicapped.

On November 6, 1980, he assaulted

another student and broke a school window.

He was interviewed by

the school principal and admitted his misconduct.

The principal

suspended him for five days and referred him to the student
Placement Committee, which recommended his expulsion.

Doe's

mother received a letter notifying her of the Committee's
recommendation and informing her that she had a right to a
conference with the Committee on November 25.

The Committee also

continued Doe's suspension indefinitely under former Cal. Educ.
Code §48903, substantially incorporated at current Cal. Educ.

lThat statute provides:
The term "handicapped children" means •••
seriously emotionally disturbed ••• children
••• who by reason thereof require special
education and related services. 20 u.s.c.
§1401.

-

j

-

Code §48911, which allowed extension of suspension beyond five
days pending resolution of expulsion proceedings.

Doe's counsel

objected to these procedures on the ground that they violated the
EAHCA, asked that the expulsion hearing be canceled, and that an
IEP team be convened.

He also filed suit in d.ct.

On November

24, the day before the scheduled hearing, the San Francisco
Unified School District canceled the expulsion proceeeding.
December 2, the d.ct. issued
to readmit Doe to the school.

a ~~ ordering

On

the school district

On December 10, it entered a

temporary injunction against the school district barring it from
excluding him while efforts were being made to find alternative
placement for him pursuant to his IEP recommendation.

Doe

returned to the school on December 15.
Smith's situation is similar.

Pursuant to his IEP team

recommendation, he had been placed in a special education program
in a regular school setting at A.P. Giannini School.

His IEP

stated that this was "on a trial basis dependent upon [Smith's]
ability to adapt to a regular school."

Following a number of

incidents of misbehavior on Smith's part, the school unilaterally
reduced his program to a half-day schedule.

Smith's grandparents

were notified of this reduction and agreed to it, although they
apparently were not apprised of their right to challenge it under
the EAHCA.
On November 14, 1980, Smith made sexual comments to several
female students.

He admitted to doing so to the school

principal, who suspended him for five days and referred him to
the Student Placement Committee for expulsion.

The Committee

-

4

-

notified Smith's grandparents that it was recommending Smith's
expulsion to the San Francisco School Board, that a conference
was set for December 2, and that it was continuing his suspension
pending resolution of the expulsion proceeding.
objected to the expulsion proceedings.

Smith's counsel

The Committee canceled

the hearing and offered to restore Smith to his half-day program
or provide him horne tutoring.

Smith's grandparents elected horne

tutoring, which began December 10.
January 6, 1981.

An IEP team convened on

Smith's counsel became aware of Doe's suit and

sought the d.ct.'s leave to intervene.

The court granted that

request.
Resps named as defendants the school district, the
individual officials involved in the decisions regarding resps,
and the State Superintendant of Public Instruction.

As relevant

to their claims here, they sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against the district and its officials on account of its
officials' direct actions against them, and against the State
Superintendant of Public Instruction on the basis of his failure
(1) to establish a policy regarding the discipline of handicapped
students, (2) to monitor the district's compliance with the
EAHCA, and (3) to intervene when the district deprived them of
their rights under the EAHCA.
V"'

The district court granted injunctive and declaratory relief

--

against the district on December 2, 1983, and against the State
Superintendant on April 23, 1984.

It ruled first that because of

its purpose of assuring handicapped children a meaningful public ~~.
education, the EAHCA prohibits expulsion of handicapped children

-----------

-

~

-

for behavior that is a result of their hanGicap, and that
California accordingly could not apply its statute regarding
expulsion to handicapped children because it oio not make an
exception to its grounds for expulsion for handicap-caused
behavior.
20

u.s.c.

Second, it held that the EAHCA's "stay put" provision,
§1415(e) (3), which provides that

During the pendency of any [EAHCA review
proceedings], unless the State or local educational
agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the
chilo shall remain in the then current educational
placement of such chilo
barred suspensions of handicapped children for more than five
days, because a longer suspension would constitute a change in
placement.

Third, it ruled that before making any change in

placement, a district was required by 34 C.F.R. §104.35, which
states that
A recipient that operates a public elementary or
secondary education program shall conduct an [IEP]
evaluation ••• of any person who, because of handicap,
needs ••• special education or related service before
taking any action with respect to the initial placement
of the person in a regular or special education program
ana any subsequent change in placement
to convene an IEP team to evaluate the chilo's needs ana assure
that the change was consistent with those needs.
ruled that 20

u.s.c.

Finally, it

§1414(d) obligated the state to provide

services directly to children whom the district was serving
inadequately.

The court enjoined all defendants against taking

disciplinary measures against handicapped children except after
following these procedures, and directed the State to provide

- 6 -

services directly to any children whom a local educational agency
was not serving appropriately.
Both the district and the State appealed to the CA9.
appeals were apparently consolidated.

The

Apparently nobody

seriously contested the ruling regarding expulsions.

With

respect to the "stay put" provision, the district and State
argued that the EAHCA should not be interpreted to bar schools
from taking disciplinary steps necessary to protect the safety of
both handicapped and non-handicapped children in the school, and
that suspensions for longer than five days were such steps.

As

to the necessity of convening an IEP team before making any
change in placement, according to the court of appeals they
conceded the applicability of 34 C.F.R. §104.35, but argued that
it did not cover all significant changes of program or services,
since they did not amount to a change in placement.
State argued that 20

u.s.c.

Finally, the

§1414 did not require it to intervene

where a district was failing to serve an individual student, but
only where it failed to provide a program for a class of
students.
The court of appeals affirmed except for the five day
limitation on suspensions.

While recognizing the practical

difficulties created by such a holding, it ruled that an
indefinite suspension pending completion of EAHCA proceedings was
a "change in placement" within the meaning of the EAHCA, and
accordingly forbidden by the "stay put" provision, although a
thirty day suspension was permissible.

It held that significant

changes of program or services constituted a change in placement

-

I

-

in 34 C.F.R. §104.35 and hence required an , IEP team evaluation.
And it ruled that §1414 required the State to intervene directly
in cases where the local agency was not serving an individual
student.
3.

CONTENTIONS.

Only the State is seeking cert from this

decision, but it is seeking it with regard to all three
rulings.It contends as follows:
The CA9's ruling on the "stay put" provision creates a
conflict in the circuits.

CAl, 5, and 11 have recognized that

§1415(e) (3) does not eliminate schools' authority to protect
other schoolchildren and the handicapped child himself through
suspensions.

In Doe v. Brookline School Committee, 722 F.2d 910

(1983), CAl recognized that the provision was directory, not
mandatory.

In Jackson v. Franklin Co. Sch. Bd., 765 F.2d 535

(1985), CAS upheld the

suspension of a learning disabled

seventeen year old who had unbuttoned another student's blouse
and touched her breasts despite the pendency of EAHCA proceedings
on the ground that there is an exception to the stay put
requirement where the child is a danger to himself or others.
And in Victoria L v. Dist. Sch. Bd., 741 F.2d 369 (1984), CAll
approved the suspension of a handicapped student who brought a
razor blade and martial arts weapon to school and threatened to
kill or injure another student while the student's EAHCA
proceedings were pending, because "Congress had no intent to
deprive local school boards of their traditional authority to
insure a safe school environment."
is erroneous.

t .,.

~·.

In addition the CA9's ruling

Surely schools must be able to protect children

- 8 -

during the pendency of EAHCA proceedings.

Hence §1415(e) (3) 's

use of "shall" should be interpreted as directory rather than
mandatory.
There is no split on the other issues, but if left
unreviewed the CA9's decision is likely to form the baseline for
decisions in this area in the future.

The court erred in its

ruling that 34 C.F.R. §104.35 requires an IEP team evaluation
before any change in placement of handicapped children, because
§104.35 does not implement the EAHCA, but the Rehabilitation Act,
to which the school district is not subject.

See §104.1 ("The

purpose of this part is to effectuate section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 •••• ")

Finally, CA9's interpretation

of §1414(d) (3) "amounts to legislating by the court."
13.

Petn at

Section 1414(d) provides:
Whenever a State educational agency determines
that a local educational agency -(1) is unable or unwilling to establish and
maintain programs of free appropriate public education
which meet the requirements established in subsection
(a) of this section;
(2) is unable or unwilling to be consolidated with
other local educational agencies in order to establish
and maintain such programs; or
(3) has one or more handicapped children who can
best be served by a regional or State center designed
to meet the needs of such children;
the State educational agency shall use the
payments which would have been available to such local
educational agency to provide special education and
related services directly to handicapped children
residing in the area served by such local educational
agency. The State educational agency may provide such
education and services in such manner, and at such
locations (including regional or State centers) as it
considers appropriate, except that the manner in which

-

~

-

..
such education and services are provided shall be
consistent with the requirements of this subchapter.
Petr argues that §1414(d) (3) is intended to address the
situation where the best way of serving a category of children's
needs is by having them attend something like a State School for
the Deaf, not to substitute the State for the district when the
individual child is not being well served.

That problem is to be

remedied through the various appeal mechanisms created by other
provisions of the statute.
4.

DISCUSSION.

CA9 is clearly in conflict with CAS and

CAll with respect to the stay put provision.

It is not squarely

in conflict with CAl, because in the case petr cites, the
question was whether a district court could order a change in
placement during pendency of EAHCA proceedings.
it could do so in extraordinary circumstances.

CAl ruled that
In fact CA9

suggested that judicial relief would be available to a school
placed in an impossible situation, and hence seems to agree with
CAl.
Moreover, interpretation of the stay put provision in this
situation presents an important question of federal law, and of
federal/state authority in the school context.

Although, as CA9

recognizes, its reading of the statute is unpalatable, it may
well be correct.

CAS and 11, and petr, do not offer a plausible

basis in its language to find an exception to 141S(e) (3) 's
seemingly absolute requirement.
potentially deserving of review.

In any event, the question is

... v

The other two questions are probably

~ot

independently

worthy of review, but CA9's decision on them seems sufficiently
questionable that they may be worth entertaining if the Court
takes the "stay put" issue.

Petr may have waived its argument

that 34 C.F.R. §104.35 does not apply to EAHCA recipients, since
it apparently conceded before the CA9 that the regulation applied
but argued that no change of placement had occurred.

Before

taking that issue the Court might want to call for the record to
make sure it is preserved.

On the third issue, when the State

must substitute for the local education association, petr's
argument seems quite persuasive.
5.

RECOMMENDATION.

Call for a response and call for the

record with a view toward granting issues 1 and 3, and possibly
2.

There is no response.
~

December 8, 1986

Liberman

opn in petn

---~ -)

PL EMENT~ ,~MORANDUM
January 9, 1987 Con
List 1, Sheet 3
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No. 86-728
Honig

v.
Doe
1.

SUMMARY.

Resps have filed an opposition to cert. whose

- ---~---~

contentions are summarized below.
2.

CONTENTIONS.

Resps contend that petrs did not raise and

CA9 did not decide the first question they present for review,
whether the "stay put" provision has an exception for children
endangering themselves or others.

They also argue that there is

no split between CAl and CA9 on this question, for the reasons I

- 3 -

- 2 -

gave in my original memo.

Additionally, they state that the CAS

and 11 cases are distinguishable.

The CAS case, they argue,

involved not only a suspension but a decision by the juvenile
court to commit the handicapped plaintiff to a state hospital for
evaluation.

The plaintiff then sought readmission to his prior

public school placement.

Hence in that case the change in

placement had been made not by the school district but by the
juvenile court.

In addition, when the district conducted its

IEP, it offered the plaintiff a series of alternatives.

As for

the CA 11 case, it did not involve an expulsion, but a transfer
to an Alternative Learning Center on which a due process hearing
had been held.

Finally, resps argue that petrs' view of the

"stay put" provision would gut the EAHCA.
Regarding petrs' second contention, that an IEP team need
not be convened before making changes in placement, resps argue
that this does not raise a significant question of federal law.
Below, petrs agreed that an IEP team did need to be convened, but
disagreed about what kinds of changes in a program rose to the
level of a change in placement.

That is a factbound

determination.
Regarding petrs' last contention, that the State must step
in to provide appropriate education to particular children where
the local educational agency has failed to do so, resps cite
legislative history to the effect that the State was intended to
have the ultimate responsibility for assuring that services are
provided, and contend that the d.ct.'s order was a proper
exercise of its powers of equity.

- 3 -

3.

DISCUSSION.

I think the Court still needs the record,

including the briefs on appeal, to check what is preserved.
Contrary to resps' contention, the CA9 did decide the first
question petrs raise, and ruled that school districts could not
suspend dangerous handicapped children.

It is possible that

petrs did not argue that they could, but that seems improbable to
me.

The distinctions resps note between this case and the CAS

and CAll cases do not persuade me that the split is contrived.
CAS did not rely on the intervention of the juvenile court in its
ruling.

Nor do I see how the fact that the district offered

alternative placements there would matter under the CA9's view,
since the CA9's position is that placement may not be changed at
all over the objection of the parents until completion of EAHCA
proceedings.

The distinction of the CAll case is even thinner:

petrs do not seek to defend their right to expel handicapped
children, but only their right to suspend them pending completion
of EAHCA proceedings.

Hence the fact that this case initially

involved expulsions (which the District backed down on in any
event) is irrelevant.

In addition the parents could have had a

due process hearing, but turned one down, because their entire
claim was that they were entitled to more than the due process
required, i.e. EAHCA proceedings.
Resps do not argue directly that petrs did not raise below
their second contention, the inapplicability of the regulation
requiring convening of an IEP team.

Their brief reinforced my

instinct that they did not, however, because it does not address
that argument at all, but instead addresses the argument petrs

- 4 -

apparently did make below regarding the meaning of "change in
placement."
Resps' argument regarding petrs' third contention, that
1414{d) (3) requires the State to provide services directly, is
addressed to the merits of that contention, not to its certworthiness.

Regarding that provision, I wonder if there is a

private cause of action to enforce any portion of 1414{d).

I

think its enforcement may be the exclusive responsibility of the
Secretary of Education.
might be helpful.

The views of the S-G on that question

Hence if the Court grants cert. it might want

to consider inviting the S-G to file a brief.
4.

RECOMMENDATION.

Call for the record with a view toward

granting questions 1 and 3, and possibly 2.
December 11, 1986

Liberman

J~

f(
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SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
February 20, 1987 Conference
p. 35 of Con£. List
No. 86-728
Honig

v.
Doe
1.

SUMMARY.

The briefs on appeal before CA9 indicate that

issues (1) and (3) were preserved, and that issue (2) was not.
2.

DISCUSSION.

Before CA9, at pp. 21-23 of its initial

brief, California objected to the d.ct.'s order barring any
suspensions exceeding five days on the ground that schools have
to be able to exclude dangerous children.

It also objected to

that feature of the order on pp. 6-7 . of its reply brief and cited

-

2 -

S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 n.9 (1981), the footnote on
which CAS relied for its holding in Jackson that schools retained
that authority.

That is enough in my view to preserve issue 1.

Pp. 17-20 of California's initial brief address issue 3 and
argue that the S1414 only applies to the limited circumstances
outlined in its brief before this Court.

California does not

argue, here or there, that S1414 is not privately enforceable,
either directly or under S1983.
On p. 16 of its initial brief, California discusses the
regulation that formed the basis of CA9's ruling on issue 2, but
does not argue its inapplicability to EAHCA matters.

Rather it

argues that it only applies to changes in placement, not changes
in programs.
3.

RECOMMENDATION.

Grant on issue 1, deny on issue 2, deny

on issue 3 (because S1414 is probably not privately enforceable,
in which case the question of its scope would best be determined
in an enforcement action brought by the Secretary of Education
after an administrative interpretation).
February 6, 1987

Liberman

